BARGAINING AND THE DETERMINANTS OF TEACHER SALARIES TODD EASTON*
This study examines the impact of collective bargainitig on salary setting in public school districts. Using a 1969-82 sample of Oregon school districts, the author focuses particularly on the roles of two factors before and after the introduction of collective bargaining: salary comparisons between school districts and school districts' ability and willingness to pay for education. No evidence is found that ability and willingness to pay influenced salary setting either before or after collective bargaining began, suggesting that bargaining does not serve to widen the gap in educational opportunity between wealthy and poor districts. On the other hand, inter-district salary comparisons significantly influenced salary setting throughout the period, but bargaining had little effect on the influence of that factor. I N response to increases in public sector employment and rapid growth in public sector collective bargaining, economists in the 1980s have paid more and more attention to public employee salary determination. Public school teachers must he counted among the most important groups of public employees to study: 13 percent of public employees in 1980 were teachers, and 60 to 70 percent of those teachers were working under collectively bargained contracts in the early 1980s.i Teacher * The author is Assistant Professor of Business Administration at the University of Portland. He thanks Clair Brown and David Stern for suggestions that substantially strengthened this paper. For their cooperation in providing data or interviews, he also thanks employees of the State of Oregon, especially in the Department of Education; employees and members of the Oregon Education Association; employees of the Oregon School Board's Association; and school administrators from various school districts.
' No direct counts of teachers working under collectively bargained contracts are available. Therefore, this percentage is an estimate, using assumptions suggested by Will Myers, manager of the salary determination has received considerable attention, but most research has focused narrowly on estimating the salary differential between bargaining and nonbargaining school districts.T he question addressed by this study is, rather, whether the impact of bargaining has differed as a function of the characteristics of the school districts involved. Eor example, does a school district's ability and willingness to pay for education have a bigger effect on salary setting in the presence of collective bargaining or in its absence? If collective bargaining amplifies the importance of ability and willingness to pay, then its presence will tend to exaggerate the differences between wealthy and poor districts in teachers' salariesEconomics and Collective Bargaining Department of the National Education Association. The estimate is consistent with the proportion of teachers bargaining in a large, national sample of school districts under contract in 1977: 60 percent (Woodbury 1985:203) .
For a recent review of these studies, see Lipsky (1982) . Review, Vol. 41, No. 2 (January 1988 The approach I take is to compare the determinants of district salary levels before and after legalized collective bargaining. The methodology is noteworthy in two respects. Eirst, the study follows a sample of Oregon school districts between 1969 and 1982. The length of that period gives one the potential to link changes in institutional environment to changes in bargaining outcomes, as well as to examine the stability of the salary setting process. Second, the study examines the determination of salaries, class sizes, and total current school expenditures in a simultaneous framework, allowing a close examination of the relationships among these three variables. For example, the simultaneous framework allows a more discriminating look at the relationship between spending levels and salaries than studies in which a single variable measures district willingness to spend on education.
Industrial and Labor Relations

Hypotheses
Although this study examines a number of possible effects bargaining might have on salary setting, two particular hypotheses structure the approach used. Specifically, two factors are expected to have played an increased role in the salary determination process once legalized collective bargaining became established: (1) comparisons to teacher salaries in different districts; and (2) school district wealth and other determinants of ability and willingness to pay.
Salary Comparisons
Both prior research (Gerwin 1973) and interviews with school district administrators suggest that administrators used comparisons between their district and others as an important part of the salary determination process even before collective bargaining began. Administrators have access to information about salary levels in other districts, often compiled by a statewide school board association. School boards and administrators generally wish to match Since apparently "district management" (a phrase used here to refer to the school board and district administrators as a group) pays attention to salaries elsewhere, one might expect salary comparisons to play an important role in salary setting both before and after the advent of legalized collective bargaining. It seems likely, though, that bargaining would increase the importance of comparisons, since bargaining adds comparisons made by other groups-including the union, the public, and fact-finders-to those made by administrators.
Within a teachers' union, the membership will likely evaluate a negotiated contract by comparing it with contracts negotiated elsewhere. As Arthur Ross put it, comparisons "establish the dividing line between a square deal and a raw deal" (1948:51) . In Oregon, those involved in bargaining report that both sides tend to use neighboring districts, such as districts in the same football league, as a yardstick. Bargainers in large districts, on the other hand, sometimes make comparisons within a broader orbit, comparing their district to a sample of large districts around the state.
When bargaining approaches a deadlock, comparisons may become even more important. To win concessions at the bargaining table, public employee unions not only may threaten to strike (a legal recourse for Oregon teachers) but may exert political pressure . Teachers frequently cultivate public sympathy for their bargaining position, and comparisons with other districts are one means for gaining support.
Eurther, impasse resolution procedures in many states call for fact-finding (or arbitration). Salary comparisons have a strong influence on fact-finders, an influence refiected in the concern management groups in Oregon have had with the impact of fact-finding on salary costs. The Oregon School Boards Association agenda for the 1983 legislative session included a law recommending that "mediators and fact-finders should consider the current, local economic conditions of each school district and avoid over-emphasis on statistical comparisons with other school districts."
Ability to Pay
The second hypothesis, that the presence of collective bargaining will increase the responsiveness of the salary determination process to the school district's ability and willingness to pay, is based on findings of private sector collective bargaining studies. Researchers have found positive correlations between wage levels and variables linked to a firm's "ability to pay." For example, some studies have found that unionized firms in industries with high concentration ratios pay higher wages than unionized firms in low concentration ratio industries, suggesting that unions in those industries have been able to win a share of the monopoly profits earned by such firms (see, for example, Kwoka 1983; Mishel 1986 ). In the case of the public schools, the willingness of district residents to tax themselves (and the district's businesses) is the ultimate budget constraint on district management. If, for example, wealthier districts are more willing to spend on education, perhaps an effective teachers' union could translate that willingness into higher salaries than in less prosperous districts.
If such a pattern obtains, it should be of interest to educational policy makers. Even without salary disparities, wealthier districts may have an advantage in recruiting teachers, due to attractive teaching conditions. If collective bargaining created (or increased) salary disparities between rich and poor districts, poor districts would find it harder still to hire good teachers.
Gallagher studied the interaction of bargaining and budgeting in a sample of 133 Illinois school districts, roughly half of which had collective bargaining, during the 1973-74 school year. He divided the sample into low-, medium-, and highwealth districts. Eor medium-and highwealth districts, he found higher total spending in bargaining than in nonbargaining districts, with the spending difference being significantly larger in the high-wealth districts. Spending on salaries was significantly higher in the bargaining districts than in the non-bargaining districts in all three wealth categories, but there was no significant tendency for the salary advantage to increase with district wealth. Since the salary budget, but not total spending, was larger in the lowwealth districts, teachers may have forced some reallocation of resources in these districts. Unfortunately, Gallagher had no data on salary levels or class sizes, so it is not possible to tell direcdy how allocation decisions by districts were influenced by bargaining.
Two outcomes define the extremes of a continuum of ways bargaining and budgeting might interact. On the one hand, there niight be salary increases with no change in total spending, so that all the increase would be reflected in rising class sizes or in lower spending on items outside the teacher salary budget. On the other hand, salary increases could accompany spending increases, with no effect on class size or the rest of the budget. Gallagher's study suggests that outcomes of the first sort occur in poorer districts and outcomes of the second sort in richer districts. But whether the salary increases are accompanied by a redistribution of resources or an increase in the total resources going to the schools, there is some reason to think that increased spending on teacher salaries would be more likely in wealthy districts.
Bargaining could more easily cause a redistribution of funds in high-spending districts because such districts tend to spend a larger proportion of their budgets on non-basic programs, which managers might be willing to give up in a pinch. Eor example, in a study of 195 larger Michigan school districts in the late 1960s, Barro and Garrol found that the highestspending districts were the ones that spent the largest proportion of their budgets on educational specialists and for supplies and equipment.
In the second outcome, higher spending adds to salary levels, with class sizes and spending on other program items remaining at the former level. How might such increases in spending come about? The theory that has been most often used to analyze the determinants of school district spending is the median voter model. (For a good example of this approach see Inman 1978 .) It begins with the observation that, in an election to establish the level of output for a single public service, where voters have single peaked preferences and vote those preferences sincerely, the output level preferred by the median voter will defeat all other proposals. The model further assumes that this output level-and the associated level of taxation-will actually be offered to voters in a levy election, so that the median voter's preferences prevail. In this context there are two major avenues by which a teachers' union may change the election's outcome.
Eirst, one could assume voters see a rise in teacher salaries as a rise in the price of educational services. If this assumption is correct, and if voters' demand for educational services is inelastic, then the spending level preferred by voters will rise with the rise in salary. Ehrenberg's (1973:377) estimates of employment elasticities in education are consistent with this outcome. Second, the union may work to change voters' preferences. Eor example, Oregon teacher union locals frequently appeal directly to the public for support for increases in school spending. The median voter model, then, leaves some room for teachers to influence school district spending. But if one adjusts for deficiencies in the model, several other avenues for teacher influence appear. Most important, it seems unwarranted to assume that the median voter's preferred level of taxation will be offered to voters in a levy election. School boards generally decide what the levy offered to voters will be, and there is no reason to expect a direct correspondence between voter preferences and school board actions, even if one could analyze voter preferences using a system as spare as the median voter model.3 School board elections are multidimensional, and candidates seldom have well-defined positions on spending levels.
Moreover, as Romer and Rosenthal point out, there is room for the organization that sets the agenda in an election to infiuence the outcome. Suppose voters choose between two options, a proposed spending level and a fall-back level that will prevail if the proposed level is voted down. A voter might favor the proposed level even if it exceeds his or her most preferred level, as long as the proposed level is preferable to the fall-back level. Thus, there is room for a union (or other interest groups) to infiuence an election's outcome by infiuencing the agenda set.
To summarize, all of the connections discussed among the union, salary levels, and budgeting might be infiuenced by the ability and willingness of a district's residents to support educational spending. Redistributing budget resources to the salary budget would likely be easiest when spending per pupil is highest. Demand for educational services might well be most price inelastic in the wealthiest, most high-income districts. Voters in the wealthiest districts might be easiest to convince of the importance of supporting higher levels of school spending. Einally, the "room" district management has to infiuence the district's spending level (via their control of the agenda) might be largest in the most wealthy districts.
Context and Description of the Study
Legalized collective bargaining and a widespread role for teachers' unions are relatively new in Oregon. Before the 1974-75 school year, a meet and confer law governed public sector labor relations.
' A case study of budgeting and bargaining in Illinois found wide differences in behavior between school district management in roughly similar positions (Cresswell et al. 1979) . Some districts actually planned on deficit spending in order to reach the level of salaries the board thought appropriate. Other districts levied less than the maximum they were entitled to, in order to maintain a safety margin for future years.
Although in a few districts formal negotiations took place under this statute, it generally left teachers in a weak position with respect to school boards. In October 1973 the current public sector bargaining law was passed. By the 1975-76 school year, Oregon Education Association (OEA) locals had been recognized as representing teachers in most major districts, and labor relations in those districts was governed by collectively bargained contracts.
On the whole, teacher bargaining in Oregon is probably comparable to that occurring elsewhere. An important indicator of the character of bargaining in Oregon is the nature of the contracts negotiated. One researcher studying a nationwide sample of contracts found that Oregon contracts dealt with as comprehensive a range of issues as did contracts elsewhere, except for those in big city districts, especially those in the Northeast (Goldschmidt) .
The framework of collective bargaining and school finance in Oregon has three distinctive elements. First, Oregon is one of seven states in which teachers have the legal right to strike. Although many teacher strikes occur outside these states, the right to strike generally would strengthen the union's hand since it removes the anti-strike injunction from management's toolbox. Second, school finance in Oregon depends more on local revenues than is typical for the United States as a whole. The share of local funds in total current expenditures averaged 37 percent in Oregon in 1979-80, twelfth highest of all states. The national average was 43 percent in the same year (U.S. Department of Education 1982.74). This predominance of local funding probably results in larger between-district differences in ability and willingness to pay than in most states. In this respect, Oregon should be a good place to test whether ability and willingness to pay affects teacher salaries.
Third, the institutions structuring voter approval for property tax levies in Oregon differ from those most commonly used in other states. In the majority of Oregon districts, voters must approve annually the dollar amount of the property taxes levied to support the school district.** It therefore seems likely that in these districts voters have more control over spending levels than, for example, in states where they approve a tax rate to be levied against a district's property tax wealth.
This study compares salary determination before collective bargaining was legalized to salary determination after legalization. The pre-bargaining period, designated Period 1, runs from the 1969-70 school year to school year 1973-74. Period 2 includes the transition to a collective bargaining system in which the vast majority of districts participated, from 1973-74 to 1977-78 The unit of analysis for this study is the school district. The 55 districts that are examined are all the unified districts in the state that have been in existence '' There are two types of taxing authority for Oregon school districts. The "special levy" is the temporary taxing authority referred to in the text. The permanent taxing authority, called a "tax base," allows a district to levy an approved amount in perpetuity, and to increase the amount up to 6 percent per year without voter approval. During most of the years included in this study, nearly all districts relied on special levies. Only 7 percent of the districts in the sample for this study relied solely on a tax base in the 1976-77 school year, though by 1981-82 that proportion rose to 31 percent.
The fmal year of the study, 1981-82, was the most recent school year for which complete data were available when the data for this study were collected.
The salary measure used is the average annual salary of instructional staff; data reported are for the fall of each year. Oregon salaries were about 4 percent above the national average in 1969, about 9 percent below the national average in 1974, and varied with respect to the national average between 1978 and 1981 (U.S. Department of Education, various years). A graph summarizing the data is available on request from the author.
(without boundary changes) since 1969,â nd that also had an average daily attendance of over 1,600 in either 1969 or 1981, This standard of 1,600 was set to allow some geographical diversity in the sample (75 percent of Oregon's counties are included) without allowing it to be dominated by small districts, where bargaining is less apt to be an adversarial process. Twenty percent of the sample districts lie within the Pordand metropolitan area.
Data for the study were gathered by the author from a variety of sources. Salary data are from salary surveys assembled by the Oregon School Boards Association. School district revenue, spending, class size, and enrollment data come from the Oregon Department of Education, Socioeconomic data on school districts are from the 1970 and 1980 U.S. Census of Population and Housing, which the Census Bureau tabulates by school district.
Estimating Salary, Class Size, and Expenditure Levels
The model to be estimated consists of three equations, each of which will be discussed in its turn. The first equation characterizes the determination of school expenditure levels, the second the determination of class sizes, and the third the determination of salaries.» The model will be estimated four times, using data from two school years before collective bargaining began (1969-70 and 1973-74) and two school years after (1977-78 and 1981-82) . Coefficients estimated in the four years will then be examined to seek evidence for structural change in the forces affecting salaries.
The expenditure equation is:
(1) EXPUP = + ' A unified school district is one that includes both primary and secondary schools. The exclusion of districts made up solely of primary schools or solely of secondary schools makes educational costs more comparable between sample districts; costs per pupil are significantly higher in high schools.
The structure of the model is somewhat similar to Chambers (1978) , though the independent variables chosen differ.
Eor each district in the sample, EXPUP = school expenditures per pupil; BASE = tax base per pupil; FOREST = Eederal Eorest Eees plus Common School Eund receipts, per pupil; Y = average household income; soc = socioeconomic characteristics of district residents;^ PUPTCH = the pupilteacher ratio; and SAL = a measure of the district's salary level, based on its salary schedule.'0 (Eor definitions of these and other variables, see Table 1 .)
The form chosen is quite general; each of the independent variables found to be significant in other studies is entered in a linear form, BASE and Y are entered to represent wealth and income effects on school expenditures by residents, EOREST accounts for local revenues from non-property tax sources; districts witĥ Both the socioeconomic variables and the average household income variable are taken from the 1970 and 1980 Censuses, tabulated by school district. Since the available data are restricted to 1970 and 1980, the values of these variables for the four school years examined in this study were established by interpolation.
'° SAL was computed from the salary schedule for each district. The schedule, which consists of several columns corresponding to different levels of education, determines an individual teacher's salary based on that individual's teaching experience and education. For example, an entry level teacher with a BA would typically advance one step down the BA column with each year of teaching experience, gaining a higher salary at each step. He or she could also earn more by gaining additional education: for example, the entry level teacher with a BA might advance to the next higher column after completing 45 credits beyond the BA. SAL is the arithmetic average of (a) the entry level salary for a teacher with a BA, (b) the average of the highest and the lowest salary in the MA column, and (c) the highest salary attainable on the schedule (without going beyond a BA + 120 credits or an MA -I-60 credits). A measure of a district's salary schedule is the single best indicator of bargaining success, because it is the salary schedule that is the subject of collective bargaining. An average of three points on the schedule was selected as a measure of the schedule because it was relatively easy to compute and also captured important information about the salary opportunities open to teachers with a variety of levels of education and experience. 
SREGDIF
The percentage difference between SAL and mean SAL for districts in the same region. URP One of two measures of a district's ability and willingness to pay: the difference between predicted and actual spending per pupil (unexploited revenue potential). Y Mean household income. " Each variable is defined on a school district basis. For example, BASE is the mean tax base per pupil for each district in the sample. such revenues might be expected to spend more than districts for which the only source of local funding is the property tax.
SOC includes socioeconomic characteristics of district residents found to influence spending levels in other studies: the proportion of residents who are professional, technical, and kindred workers; the proportion of district households with children; and the proportion of district residents who rent. All three variables are expected to have a positive impact on expenditures: residents working in occupations requiring substantial education, residents with children, and renters (who may assume that they will not pay for a property tax increase)-are all expected to give above-average support to educational spending, PUPTCH and SAL are included to account for possible simultaneity in the expenditure determination process. That is, decisions about a district's class size and salary schedule may influence spending per pupil as much as spending decisions influence class size and salary schedule.
The class size and salary equations for the salary determination model are: + "3 For each district in the sample, ENROLL = enrollment (average daily membership); dENROLL = average annual percentage change in enrollments over the previous four years; and REGSINDX = an index of salary levels for regions within the state." Y and SOC represent characteristics of district residents that might influence their educational priorities, EXPUP represents the district's budget constraint; additional dollars available may be spent on smaller class sizes or higher salaries.
ENROLL is expected to have a positive influence on class size; smaller schools frequently have small classes as a result of having few students studying specialized subjects and smaller districts are apt to have smaller schools. The rate of change of enrollment (dENROLL) also appears as an independent variable in the class size equation, because individuals interviewed suggested enrollment changes significantly affect districts. Hiring in districts that experience rapid enrollment increases may lag behind enrollments, perhaps partly because administrators wish to avoid rapid increases in the district budget. As a result, class sizes might tend to rise in such districts. On the other hand, declining enrollments may contribute to smaller classes, perhaps because administrators wish to avoid layoffs.
The size of the district's enrollment (ENROLL) may influence salary levels for '' Computed based on limited data, using two regional salary surveys. From the first survey, taken in 1974 by the Local Government Personnel Institute, secretary, registered nurse, and police salaries were used. From the second, taken in 1980 by the Cascade Employers Association, senior secretary and police salaries were used. An index of salary levels for each of seven regions was developed from these data, combining 1974 and 1980 data. Jobs included in the index had precise descriptions and sufficient individuals sampled in each region. For the region with the lowest salary (Central and Eastern Oregon), the index has a value of 91, and for the highest-salary region (Portland Metropolitan Area) it has a value of 114. two reasons. Eirst, there is a wellestablished tendency for larger districts (like larger businesses) to pay higher salaries (see, for example. Chambers 1978; Hall and Carroll 1973) . Second, the passage of the bargaining law may strengthen this tendency, because it was the bargaining law that legalized strikes. Ultimately, teachers' bargaining power in any district rests on their ability to shut down the schools with a strike. All else equal, strikes are more disruptive in large districts than in small districts because of the greater number of strike breakers who must be hired and placed. Teacher union members from small districts have mentioned size as a factor limiting their bargaining power.
One other variable is the salary level of regions within the state (REGSINDX) in the salary level equation. A measure of salary levels outside of teaching has been an important explanatory variable in many studies (see, for example, Erey 1975; Gustman and Clement 1977) . Most investigators treat this variable as a measure of teachers' opportunity wage; alternatively, one might see it as a measure of what school boards and community residents see as a fair salary for teachers in the district. One district personnel director interviewed for this study suggested that salaries that were too far above residents' salary levels would hurt the district's ability to pass levies to finance school operations, and salaries that were too far below those of residents would badly damage staff morale.
Estimating Salary Changes
With few exceptions, other salary determination studies have been limited to an examination of salary levels.'2 An important advantage of estimating an equation in terms of the rate of change of variables over time, however, is that it implicitly controls for variables omitted from the equations estimated, at least to the extent '^ Two exceptions should be noted: a 1973 study by Lipsky and Drotning and an excellent 1980 study by Baugh and Stone. these variables remain unchanged over the period in question.
Equation (4) is derived by beginning with a reduced form salary equation and taking first differences.'^ One exogenous variable, REGSINDX, is omitted because of data deficiencies. Tfiree variables-EN-ROLL, SDIFF, and AW-are added to the equation resulting from first differences to test specific hypotheses about the nature of the salary setting process. The added items give the value of the variable in question at the beginning of the period at hand. The remaining items give the annual percentage change of the variable through that period. For each district in the sample, SDIFF = the percentage difference between SAL for the district in question and average SAL for a group of comparison districts, and AW = one of two different measures of a district's ability and willingness to increase property tax revenues per pupil. The district enrollment variable (EN-ROLL) is included to provide evidence regarding the subsidiary hypothesis, mentioned above, that passage of the bargaining law would have added most to the bargaining power of large districts. The SDIFF variable gives a measure of the role that comparisons might play in salary setting. For example, the first version of SDIFF used, SALDIF, is the percentage difference between the SAL of the district in question and average SAL for the whole " A difference equation would be a plausible alternative to the form presented here. It would include values for the level of the independent variables at the beginning of each period, as well as the change values included in Equation (4). Such an equation was estimated, but F statistics were lower for each period than for Equation (4) and none of the additional variables were significant in more than one period.
sample. If comparisons play the role suggested, SAL'S coefficient should be negative: an above-average value at the beginning of a period should slow subsequent salary growth, whereas a belowaverage value should speed growth.
Two variables are used as proxies for ability and willingness to pay. The first proxy, unexploited revenue potential (URP), is the difference between the property taxes the residents of a district might be expected to pay, given their characteristics, and what they actually pay. It is minus one times the residual of the regression of property tax per pupil on the exogenous variables from Equations (1) through (3) and the rate of change variables on the right-hand side of Equation (4).i'* Districts that are levying higher property taxes than similarly situated districts will have negative values for unexploited revenue potential. The second measure of ability and willingness to pay is the district's property tax rate (PRATE) . It is hypothesized that district residents' willingness to spend on schools is based importantly on a comparison between property tax rates in their district and the rates in other districts in the state. If this hypothesis is true, a district with a high property tax rate would find it difficult to increase spending; residents would regard their rates as already being too high.
Results
One set of results presented below (Table 2) is for the equations estimated simultaneously, using two stage least squares (2SLS), with expenditure per pupil, class size, and salary level treated as endogenous variables. A second set of results (Table 3) is for the same model, but ' •* The rate of change variables are included to make the measure of unexploited revenue potential orthogonal to the other righthand variables. One departure was made from the construction described; the variable measuring district revenues from forest fees (FOREST) was replaced by the sum of forest fee revenues and revenues from state aid. Both of these should be perfect substitutes for local revenues; there are no restrictions on how districts spend revenues from either source. o^*o*t~«*^H oo*-iiDc^itOio^^oi i>cj*co r^ C) Tables 4 and 5 . The ability and willingness to pay hypothesis fares poorly in the face of the evidence provided here. Neither of the salary level equations offers the slightest indication that variables predicting spending levels also predict salary levels. In the 2SLS regressions, the coefficient of the expenditure per pupil variable is never significant, except in 1981, when it is negative-higher spending levels were associated with lower salary schedules in that year. These results are supported in the reduced form-level regressions: variables that consistently have a significant positive correlation with spending per pupil-tax base per pupil and rate of change of enrollments-have no significant positive impact on salary schedules. In fact, in two instances there are significant negative effects.
Neither do the salary change equations (Tables 4-5) provide support for the ability and willingness to pay hypothesis. When the coefficients of the unexploited revenue potential variable and the property tax rate variable are significant, their sign is opposite that predicted by the hypothesis. These results suggest (for Periods 2 and 3) that below-expected spending levels or low property tax rates at the beginning of a period lead to slower salary growth during the period.'Â t first blush, the other major hypothesis, that collective bargaining enhances the part played by comparisons in salary setting, seems to be supported by the salary change regression results. Coeffi-'^ One caution is in order regarding the level regression results. Because the rate of change of enrollment does not predict class size well, the SAL equation is empirically underidentified. It would therefore be wise to interpret the 2SLS results cautiously and to pay considerable attention to the reduced form equations.
"' Despite this finding, in equations predicting change in expenditure (not presented here), coefficients for both URP and PRATE have the expected sign in Periods 1 and 2, and are significant in Period 2. Evidently these variables predict spending changes, at least in Period 1, even though they do not predict salary changes. dents of the salary comparison variables are always significant, are relatively large, and have the expected sign in each period, suggesting that salary comparisons consistently played an important role in salary determination. Further, the size of the coefficients increases over time. On the other hand, the increases are not statistically significant, and they occur later than one would expect if the advent of collective bargaining were the cause. Most of the increase happened between Periods 2 and 3, whereas bargaining began during Period 2. Without more information about the development of bargaining during this period, it seems best to regard the regression evidence as providing suggestive, but not weighty, support for the salary comparison hypothesis.
Additional regressions, with partial results reported in Table 5 , give some indication of the sort of comparisons that have the greatest bearing on salary setting. Here the salary comparison variable was computed by grouping districts, first by size and then according to the region of the state in which they are located. These results suggest that size-specific comparisons are more telling than regional comparisons, since the coefficient of the variable computed with the districts grouped by size is generally larger than the coefficient of the regionally grouped variable. There are two clues as to tbe causes of this increase in dispersion. First, the volatility of the salary distribution increased substantially from Period 1 to Period 2, and again from Period 2 to Period 3. By 1981 only 37 percent of the districts were in the same quintile of the salary distribution that they were in during 1977.'^ Second, the increase in dispersion between 1977 and 1981 occurred mostly within the region and size groupings of districts, rather than among those groupings.
The fact that dispersion grew within groups more than among them suggests that factors other than district comparisons predominated in salary setting decisions during the final period. One possible contributor to increasing dispersion is inflation. Inflation rates were somewhat faster between 1977 and 1981 than they were between 1973 and 1977 (10.6 percent per year vs. 8.2 percent per year, measured by the national CPI). Perhaps the sensitivity of local unions and district managements to this additional pressure on money wages varied substantially among districts. For example, if a substantial number of districts had long contracts without COLA clauses, and if contract expiration dates varied within the sample, then both volatility and dispersion might ' •^ Matthews (1982) also found evidence of a volatile salary distribution in a sample of 67 Florida school districts. Examining salary patterns between 1973 and 1980, he found that 30 of the districts studied were salary leaders for their region in at least one school year. Matthews makes no comment about trends in volatility over the period studied.
well have increased during an inflationary period.
Three results of the salary equations are noteworthy. First, as in most studies, the most consistently significant variable is the index of salaries outside of teaching (described by some authors as an opportunity wage for teachers,) Second, although there is some weak evidence that salary schedules are higher in larger districts, there is little indication that this pattern persists after the introduction of collective bargaining.
Third, it appears that districts with a higher proportion of residents renting their homes consistently pay higher salaries to teachers. This result is surprising, since the only predicted impact of this variable on salaries was through the expenditure variable, and the only year in which the proportion of renters in a district had a positive impact on spending was 1977 (in the reduced form results),'* This positive connection between the proportion of residents renting and teacher salaries may reflect a tendency of salaries to be higher in urban areas. (In this sample the proportion of district residents renting is highly correlated with the proportion of district residents living in an urban area.)
The most striking aspect of the class size equations-both the 2SLS and reduced form versions-is the important role played by variables linked to ability and willingness to pay. Further, the role played by these variables increased over time.'^ The increasing importance of these variables, along with the rise in the r^ of the equation from 1969 to 1977, suggests that there was no tendency for teacher locals to win salary increases at the expense of an ' *" In contrast, other studies have found a consistent positive relationship between the proportion of renters in a tax district and the district's spending level (see, for example, Barr and Davis 1966; Bergstrom and Goodman 1973) .
'^ For example, consider the variable BASE. Even though the coefficient of BASE falls from period to period, the effect of this fall is more than offset by the tremendous increase in tax base per pupil and the substantial increase in salary levels over the study period. The beta coefficient for BASE was -.33 in 1969 and -.68 in 1981. increase in class size. If such a tradeoff had been made, one would expect the link between spending and class size to have weakened rather than strengthened.
Two aspects of the expenditure equation results have special interest. First, the reduced form results suggest that enrollment growth had a potent impact on spending levels (an impact that was not anticipated when the structural model was constructed). That is, the results suggest that if a district experiences rapid enrollment growth for four years, it tends, at the end of that period, to spend less per pupil than districts with slower enrollment growth. This pattern may well result from the way voters view tax levy proposals: they may evaluate a levy primarily by comparing the total request to what their district requested in previous years. For example, when enrollment grows rapidly it would be difflcult to get voters to approve the substantial levy increases necessary to maintain spending per pupil, whereas a district with shrinking enrollment might find it relatively easy to increase spending per pupil.
Second, there is no evidence that districts tend to spend less on schools when only a small proportion of residents have children. In f'act, in the one case in which the variable measuring the proportion of residents with children is significant, it is actually negative. This result might give pause to those who blame the crisis in local school finance on the declining proportion of families with children.
Summary
Most research on collective bargaining and public school teacher salary determination has estimated the size of bargaining's impact on salaries. One goal of the present study has been, instead, to investigate the interaction between bargaining and district wealth to see if bargaining raises salaries more in wealthy districts than in poor ones. A motivation for this research was a concern that collective bargaining in schools might widen salary differences between rich and poor districts, differences that might further un-dercut the ability of poor districts to hire high-quality teachers. This concern appears to be groundless. Though salary differentials between wealthy and poor districts did widen during the study period, this study finds no evidence that Ijargaining affected the relationship between districts' ability and willingness to pay and salary determination. In fact, the results offer no indication that ability and willingness to pay had a positive influence on salary levels at any time either before or after collective bargaining began.
A second goal of this study has been to examine the effect on salary setting of salary comparisons among school districts. The results suggest that sucb comparisons played an important role in salary setting both before and after the advent of collective bargaining, but there is no firm indication tbat the role of comparisons increased after collective bargaining began. The surprising finding that salaries in the districts studied nonetheless did not converge during the study period-and, in fact, diverged in the years 1977-81 -may reflect such factors as the differing sensitivity of local unions and district managements to inflation.
